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PETITION FOR REHEARING 
^ '11 ant herewith petitions the Court of Appeal s for 
rehearin'i «irnl inspect fti * -'- -.•-•: misapprehended or overlooked 
poinl-o uL law in I \ u\. . - ei I I I'MII hi i , i nf 
the Court as follows: 
POINT i - 11 i i- i in" rrniii'3 conoli islon, t hat appel lant 
"failed to uiai.jhall the uvideiice and demonstrate 1 ts insuf-
ficiency andr therefore, we '•"he Court) reject her challenge 
t I I I III I I II I I I Ml I I ' I I III I I III | I l" I I i I I I i i i 'III I III H I I III 1 I l lMl i i -
the 'rial court judgment is correct,", there is iiu finding o' 
an oral contract partly performed so of course there is no 
s ., ' i "1 vv, *. 
Finding fl S (During the summer of 1978 M n , Stout 
discussed the sale of th*» honF w"Mi Mr, and Mrs. Smith, arid 
buLII'i dijieeil M wuu Li be >old lu I1 . .-a > i..ng mor, 
than an agreement: to agree to someth ui.g . 
Evi-'in 11 mi I paries n I I 
brief there is quoted all of the evidence and testimony 
of any and all communications between respondent and 
Sandra Smith for the purpose of showing there was no oral 
contract and of course therefore, the insufficiency of the 
evidence is self-evident and could not be better demonstrated. 
If respondent viewed the evidence differently or if 
she was relying on evidence or testimony other than that which 
was quoted in appellantfs opening brief then this should have 
been presented in her answering brief. 
And again, at page 15 of appellantfs opening brief 
the evidence and testimony is marshaled and which contains no 
evidence of part performance of the claimed oral agreement. 
By way of argument, as was attempted to be stated 
in appellant1s opening brief the quiet title judgment here 
appealed does not exhibit any independent title, nor any right 
or interest which the judgment converted to title. If it 
appeared from the judgment that respondent's claim was founded 
in fact upon an oral contract with Sandra Smith which was part] 
performed and the judgment confirmed the same and extinguished 
the appellant's adverse claim, the judgment would have connect* 
itself with the title which I believe was the point our Court 
made in State, etc. v. Santiago, 59b P.2d 335 (Utah 1979) to 
demonstrate the office of a quiet title decree. In the instant 
case there is no indication in the judgment as to how and when 
respondent acquired an ownership interest in Sandra Smith's 
one-half interest in the property. 
Additionally, it is not sufficient in order that the 
(2) 
judgment be supported by the facts, that the conclusory 
finding of oral contract partly performed be made without 
more. Clear, definite, and mutually understood terms must 
be found (Christensen v. Christensen, 9 Utah 2d 102, 339 
P.2d 101 [1959], and Homgren Brothers, Inc. v. Ballard, 
534 P.2d 611 [Utah 1975]) which are based upon clear, 
unequivocal and definite testimony, or other evidence of 
the same quality. So it would follow that if the agreement 
to be confirmed by the judgment and appellant1s interest 
extinguished then there must be evidence introduced and find-
ings made regarding completed performance of the clear, 
definite and mutually understood terms by the contracting 
party in the absence of which the judgment is not supported 
by the facts. 
Further, the acts of part performance alleged by 
respondent are not exclusively referable to the oral contract 
alleged to exist between Sandra Smith and respondent but were 
also required by the uniform contract. Downtown Athletic Club 
v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275 (UtahApp 1987). 
As in Holmgren, supra, at page 615, the court held 
"It only needs to be said that without an oral contract, its 
terms, and a mutual understanding, being proved by clear, un-
equivical and definite evidence, there is no contract to which 
the claimed acts of part performance could apply, nor is there 
a contract which the court could enforce." 
There in no record evidence of an oral contract 
(3) 
between appellant's predecessor in interest, Sandra Smith, 
and respondent and therefore the trial court's findings 
such as they are, although "detailed" in the minds of the 
panel, can and should be disturbed. Bennion v. Hansen, 699 
P.2d 757 (Utah 1985), and Harline v, Campbell, 728 P.2d 980 
(Utah 1986) . 
Finding No, 6 (Mrs. Smith acquiesced in the sale 
and agreed to the sale by showing Mrs. Stout through the 
home and discussing the purchase price of $97,500.00.) 
establishes the basis for respondent's claim on Sandra Smith 
acquiescing in the uniform contract and of her, Sandra Smith's, 
agreement therewith inferred from her showing respondent 
through the home prior to the sale, and not on a separate 
oral agreement. 
Our Court on at least two occasions has considered 
such evidence and its sufficiency to overcome the bar of the 
statute of frauds. In Coombs v. Ouzounian 465 P.2d 356 
(Utah 1970), the Court, relying on the California case of 
O'Banion v. Paradise, 61 Cal.2d 559, 39 Cal.Rptr. 370, 393 
P.2d 682 (1964), as authority, noted that in the transaction 
there before the court, the wife admitted in her deposition 
that she knew her husband was selling the property to the 
plaintiff and that she intended him to do so. However, since 
the wife was not bound by her husband's actions, whatever, 
effect her acquiescence (emphasis mine) might have had was 
ended when she granted her interest in the property to a 
third person. Such an act amounted to a tacit repudiation 
(4) 
of any conflicting oral agreement on her part. In Gregerson 
v. Jensen, 669 P.2d 396 (Utah 1983)^ where a check endorsed 
by the husband was relied on to meet the statute of frauds 
objection, the court noted that "[ajlthough [the wife] 
participated in the conversations leading up to the delivery 
of the check she signed nothing11 and in that "she has never 
signed any writing sufficient to satisfy the statute of 
frauds obligating her to sell her property to the buyers, 
there was, as the district court held, no basis for a decree 
of specific performance against the sellers." 
POINT 2 - As stated before in this petition, the basis of the 
quiet title jugment is not known so appellant dealt with the 
doctrine of merger on the theory that if the facts supported 
the imposition of merger in this case they would not therefore 
support the judgment. From the outlet it appeared to appellant 
as though respondent was attempting to show that Mr. and Mrs. 
Smith were jointly engaged in business as "Al Smith Constructio 
Company" and that the the signature of one was the signature of 
both wherefore the signature of Alvin R. Smith on the uniform 
contract for Al Smith Construction Company was also the signatu 
of Sandra Smith. And it is appellant's contention that if this 
is true with respect to the contract then it is also true with 
respect to the merged deed. 
Finding No. 3 (Al Smith Construction Campany was not 
a corporation at the time of the contract, but 'Contemporary 
Home Builders1 was a corporation with Al Smith and Sandra Smith, 
his wife, as principals.) comports with the third defense of 
(5) 
defendant's amended, answer that 
". . .Sandra Smith was a principal in Al Smith 
Construction Company and by virtue of the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract by and between Al Smith 
Construction Company and Darlene Stout, Sandra 
Smith conveyed all her right; title and interest 
in the subject real property to Darlene Stout in 
July 1978.n 
to indicate a busines relationship between Alvin R. and 
Sandra Smith (e.g., partners) whereby Alvin1s signature 
for Al Smith Construction Company wpuld bind Sandra. If 
she is bound on the contract as though sh$ had signed it 
the same would be true with respect to the merged deed even 
though the deed describes only a one-half interest. The 
doctrine is applicable where full performance by the seller 
is manifested by execution and delivery of a deed which is 
accepted by the buyer which manfests his acceptance of seller's 
performance even though the estate conveyed may differ 
from that promised in the antecedent agreement. Stubbs v. 
Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168 (Utah 1977). 
POINT 3 - The Court holds the bar of the statute of limitations 
inapplicable because the oral contract was set up in defense. 
This approach is correct if the enforcement of the oral contrac 
which is saved only by the provisions of §25-5-8 which grants 
a court the power to compel the specific performance of 
agreements in case of part performance thereof, does not have 
the nature and character of an independent action and consti-
tutes a pure defense. Otherewise, t}he bar of the statute 
applies. 54 C.J.S., § 38 Limitations of Actions, p. 76. The 
(6) 
writer has not been able to find ar>y authority on the 
specific facts of this case but it would seem the only 
reasonable interpretation that the enforcement of an 
oral agreement partly performed has the nature and 
character of an independent action 4 
If the facts support the imposition of the bar 
of the statute of limitations then they do not support the 
judgment. 
POINT 4 - Conclusion No. 1 (Darlene Stout,as purchaser and Al 
Smith dba as Al Smith Construction as seller entered a [sic] 
Uniform Real Estate Contract for the purchase of the subject 
real property.) and Conclusion No. 2 (Sandra Smith orally 
agreed to the sale and acquiesced in the sale to Stout and 
knew the sale was for the entire parcel of property.) confirm 
that we are not here dealing with a separate oral agreement 
partly performed but only with the uniform contract that canno 
be connected to Sandra Smith in any way that will satisfy the 
statute of frauds for the reasons heretofore stated. The 
conclusions and judgment therefore are not supported by the 
facts. 
CONCLUSION - It remains for the undersigned to apoligize to 
the members of the panel for the disjointed appearance in 
appellant's opening brief of the arguments presented and for 
the difficulty the members of the panel had in following these 
arguments, and to provide an explanation of the bare mention 
of "departure" at oral argument. 
(7) 
It should first be noted that the concept of departure 
was raised in the trial court on these facts, to-wit, in mid-
trial respondent was permitted to amend her answer to include 
matters variant to her first answer and sworn answers to 
interrogatories. Appellant moved the trial court to strike 
the amended answer (See Appendix hereto). No opportunity was 
given for discovery and it was appellant's position that 
respondent should not be permitted, or was estopped/ to make 
the new claims by amendment or otherwise <where she had taken 
a contrary position in the same case. The amended answer was 
the first mention of an oral contrjact partly performed but 
without allegation as to timer circumstances and terms. 
Appellant prays judgment that this petition for 
rehearing be granted and the undersigned certifies this petit: 
is presented in good faith and not! for purpose of delay. 
DATED December 9, 1988, 
ROYAL K. HUNT 
PROOF OP MAILING 
I certify that on December 9, 1988 four copies of the 
foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING wer mailed to Carl J. Nemelka 
75 North Center, American Fork, Utah 84003, by first-class mai 
ROYAL K. HUNT 
(8) 
APPENDIX 
On March 27, 1985, defendant Stout Served an amended answer 
which included allegations of agency, ratification, oral contract 
and part performance, waiver, estoppel, fraud, laches, and that 
plaintiff is not a bonafide purchaser for value without notice. 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY (and motions): Plaintiff moves the 
court to strike the said amended answer for the reasons and grounds 
it violates Rule 15(a), U.R.Ci.P., the defenses therein are 
insufficiently plead (Williams v. State t'arm Ins Co., 656 P 2d 
966 (Utah 1982) and for the reasons follpwing. 
The claims of defense contained in the amended answer are 
based on facts known to the defendant Stput at the time her 
original answer was served and filed. The function of Rule 15(a), 
U.R.Ci.P., which provides generally for the amendment of pleadings, 
is to enable a party to assert matters that were overlooked or 
were unknown to him at the time he interposed his original complain 
or answer. 6 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, 
Sec. 1473, p. 375. There was an oral apjplication by defendant 
Stout for leave to amend her pleading to! include the defense of 
estoppel. This procedure is permissible! only if plaintiff is put 
on notice of the nature and purpose of tjhe request and is given 
the same opportunity to present objections to the proposed amend-
ment as he would have if a formal motionl had been made where 
defendant Stout would, under the requirements of Rule 7(b), U.R.Ci. 
P., have to set forth with particularity bhe relief or order 
(4) 
requested and the grounds supporting th^ application. Glenn 
Falls Ins. Co. v. Newton Lmbr and Mfg C0., 388 F 2d 66 (10CCA 
1967). 
The delay in requesting the amendment is inordinate and 
inexcusable, there is bad faith on the part of defendant Stout, 
repeated failure to cure the deficiencies over a period of three 
years by seeking leave to amend, there i|s undue prejudice to the 
plaintiff by putting him through the tin|e and expense o.f continu-
ing litigation on new theories, with thq necessity for additional 
discovery, to allow the amendment would be manifestly unfair and 
unduly prejudicial to plaintiff which outweighs the right to have 
the case tried on the merits, and finally, the futility of the 
amendment is indicated from the files and records herein which 
include Interrogatories and Requests to Admit and Requests for 
Production of Documents to Defendant Darlene Stout, First Set, 
defendant Stout's Answers to Interrogatories, Requests for Admissio 
and Requests for Production, and defendant Stout's Supplemental 
Answers to Interrogatories, which show conclusively that there is 
no factual predicate for the defenses set forth in the amended 
answer. 
Interrogatory No. 2 (plaintiff to defendant) is as follows: 
"Do you claim to have any right, title, or interest, or right to the 
possession of said real property, other than by force of the Uniforn 
Real Estate Contract a copy of which is Appended to your third-
party complaint filed herein." 
On her first attempt defendant Stoutt answered "Yes." 
(5) 
Interrogatory No. 3 (plaintiff to defendant) is as follows: 
"If you have answered interrogatory 2, alcove, in the affirmative, 
state and explain such claim of interest, and include 
a. The nature and extent of the interest or claim; 
b. The type of estate you claim in the said real property; 
c. When the interest or estate was acquired; 
d. A description of any documents }jou received by which 
you claim to have acquired such interest and upon which your 
claim to said real property is based." 
Again, on her first attempt defendant Stout answered: 
3. Unanswered. 
a. See defendant's counter-claift. 
b. Legal and equitable interest 
c. See defendant's counterclaim^ 
d. A Warranty Deed. 
On her second attempt at answering interrogatory number 3 
defendant Stout again left paragraph 3 unanswered and answered 
subparagraphs a., b. , c , and d. as follovks: 
a. Ownership fee. 
b. A legal and equitable interest. 
c. On or about the 21st day of July, 1978. 
d. The Warranty Deed which was Attached to defendants 
first set of Answers to Interrogatories arid the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract which was exhibit "A" of djefendants third-party 
complaint and counterclaim. 
Interrogatory No. 5 (plaintiff to defendant) is as follows: 
(6) 
"State in detail the basis, factual and }.egal, of the allegation 
(paragraph 14, Second Cause of Action, Third Party Complaint) 
that on or about July 21, 1978, you became and still are the 
owner in fee of said real property, and describe all documents 
by title, substance and content that support such allegation." 
On her first attempt defendant Stout answered: 
"ANSWER: See Answer to Interrogatory #3. 
On her second attempt defendant Stoiit answered: 
"ANSWER-See answer to Interrogatory number 3. In addition, 
defendant would not have entered into thd Uniform Real Estate 
Contract with Al Smith alone had any representation been made 
that the only interest defendant was purchasing was an undivided 
1/2 interest. Other factual bases are included in defendant's 
allegations in her third party complaint." 
It is only reasonable to assume that a recitation of all 
facts that support the claims made in the amended ansver 
would have been provided by defendant in her responses to the 
interrogatories referred to above; in that no facts capable of 
supporting the claims of defendant in her amended complaint were 
provided it can only be assumed that none exist and it would be 
futile to permit the amendment to stand because there is no 
factual predicate therefore. 
As to said defendant's defenses as contained in her said 
amended a«@ver plaintiff moves the court for judgment on the 
pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(h)(1), U.R.Cpi.P. 
(7) 
